A distributed incentive compatible pricing mechanism for P2P networks

Jie Zhang; Zheng Zhao; Xiao Xiong; Qingwei Shi

doi:10.1117/12.748542

10 September 2007 A distributed incentive compatible pricing mechanism for P2P networks

Jie Zhang, Zheng Zhao, Xiao Xiong, Qingwei Shi

Proceedings Volume 6773, Next-Generation Communication and Sensor Networks 2007; 67730M (2007) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.748542
Event: Optics East, 2007, Boston, MA, United States

Abstract

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems are currently receiving considerable interest. However, as experience with P2P networks shows, the selfish behaviors of peers may lead to serious problems of P2P network, such as free-riding and white-washing. In order to solve these problems, there are increasing considerations on reputation system design in the study of P2P networks. Most of the existing works is concerning probabilistic estimation or social networks to evaluate the trustworthiness for a peer to others. However, these models can not be efficient all the time. In this paper, our aim is to provide a general mechanism that can maximize P2P networks social welfare in a way of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves family, while assuming every peer in P2P networks is rational and selfish, which means they only concern about their own outcome. This mechanism has some desirable properties using an O(n) algorithm: (1) incentive compatibility, every peer truly report its connection type; (2) individually rationality; and (3) fully decentralized, we design a multiple-principal multiple-agent model, concerning about the service provider and service requester individually.

Citation Download Citation

Jie Zhang, Zheng Zhao, Xiao Xiong, and Qingwei Shi "A distributed incentive compatible pricing mechanism for P2P networks", Proc. SPIE 6773, Next-Generation Communication and Sensor Networks 2007, 67730M (10 September 2007); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.748542

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