In order to promote the development of wind power, China has issued a subsidy policy for wind power. Due to the lack of research on the relationship between the scale of wind power development and the subsidy mechanism, the subsidy amount has become the financial burden of large wind power provinces and it is difficult to implement the subsidy, affecting the sustainable development of wind power. This paper analyses the subsidy mechanism to promote the scale development of wind power in the electricity market environment, and proposes Bass diffusion model integrating multiple subsidies. The optimal subsidy mechanism to promote the scale development of wind power is deduced by considering the total subsidy constraint and the scale development goal of wind power. The results show that the improved Bass diffusion model can quantify the impact of subsidies on the scale of wind power diffusion. Based on this, the proposed optimal comprehensive subsidy mechanism has a good role in promoting the scale development of wind power. At the same time, it can effectively control the subsidy gap, improve the subsidy efficiency, reduce the financial burden, and realize the sustainable scale development of wind power.
Since the construction of the domestic electricity spot market in 2017, the problem of market power abuse caused by high market concentration and poor demand-side flexibility has gradually become prominent, and the electricity market operators have gradually established a market power regulation system, with bidding price replacement and clearing price replacement as two common market power regulation measures. This paper constructs a market power regulation model based on the principal-agent mechanism and analyzes the market equilibrium and the decision interval of market participants of the above two market power regulation measures. The results show that both market power regulation measures can make the market equilibrium price be the regulated price, but under bidding price replacement regulation the market clearing quantity distorts the market resource allocation and the decision interval of market participants is narrower. Therefore, the clearing price replacement is recommended as market power regulation measures. Finally, this paper solves the optimal strategies of market participants and market operators, and concludes that the optimal strategies of market participants under both market power regulation measures are to make the market regulation ineffective, which verifies the effectiveness of market power regulation measures.
As the second largest fuel in the world and an important resource in China, the stability of coal supply and demand plays an important role in social development and stability, and the coal price is not only the embodiment of supply and demand, but also the embodiment of the stability of coal market. In this paper, the coal price index in China's coastal areas is taken as the research object, and based on ARCH and GARCH models, value-at-risk is used to quantify and warn the coal price risks. On the basis of expounding coal price forecasting model and risk assessment method, calculation and analysis of an example are carried out. The results show ARCH and GARCH models can effectively quantify the coal price risk and provide early warning information for relevant departments, so that relevant departments can take measures to deal with it.
Access to the requested content is limited to institutions that have purchased or subscribe to SPIE eBooks.
You are receiving this notice because your organization may not have SPIE eBooks access.*
*Shibboleth/Open Athens users─please
sign in
to access your institution's subscriptions.
To obtain this item, you may purchase the complete book in print or electronic format on
SPIE.org.
INSTITUTIONAL Select your institution to access the SPIE Digital Library.
PERSONAL Sign in with your SPIE account to access your personal subscriptions or to use specific features such as save to my library, sign up for alerts, save searches, etc.