KEYWORDS: Data transmission, Light sources and illumination, Control systems, Field programmable gate arrays, Computer security, Data processing, Data communications, Sensors, Network security, Detection and tracking algorithms
Tunnel lighting safety is an important condition to ensure the safe operation of the tunnel traffic, CAN bus with its simple structure, high stability, strong anti-interference ability, better scalability, as well as low cost, can be widely used in the tunnel lighting bus. The CAN protocol, however, lacks an encryption function, making it possible for hackers to launch replay attacks. In this paper, we have comprehensively analyzed the security problems of the CAN bus. We examine the security flaws present in the CAN bus, design an attack method for the CAN bus, and describe how to reverse decrypt the bus packet message with the intention of controlling the lighting system. Through the use of replay attack and reverse analysis, the lighting system's control instructions from the standard data packet were successfully decoded, it has been demonstrated through simulation experiment that the CAN bus can be quickly reverse the ordinary data packet control instruction of the system at low cost.
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